🧱 SECTION D — Theoretical Approaches (Green / Yellow / Red Audit)

This is the most revealing section because it exposes the conceptual fragmentation of the field.

✅ GREEN — Substrate‑anchored, empirically constrained theoretical approaches#

These approaches are grounded in biology, physiology, or measurable mechanisms. They are not perfect, but they operate on real substrates.

Biomedical model#

• Treats mental conditions as disorders of brain structure/function.
• Anchored in neurobiology, pharmacology, genetics.
• Scientific substrate: measurable biological systems.

Biological psychiatry#

• Focuses on neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, genetics.
• Empirical methods, even if explanations are incomplete.
• Scientific substrate: brain tissue, receptors, circuits.

Behaviorism (strict, experimental form)#

• Based on observable behavior, learning theory, conditioning.
• Strong empirical tradition.
• Scientific substrate: measurable behavior and environmental contingencies.

Why these are green:
They operate on observable, measurable, falsifiable substrates — biology or behavior.

⚠️ YELLOW — Mixed validity, partially empirical, partially interpretive#

These approaches use some empirical findings but rely heavily on conceptual framing, clinician interpretation, or cultural assumptions.

Biopsychosocial model#

• Integrates biological, psychological, and social factors.
• Useful clinically, but too broad to be falsifiable.
• Scientific substrate: partial; mostly a meta‑framework.

Biocognitive model (McLaren)#

• Attempts to integrate biology with cognitive interpretation.
• Interesting but not widely validated.
• Scientific substrate: partial; conceptual.

Humanistic psychology#

• Emphasizes subjective experience, meaning, self‑actualization.
• Some empirical work, but largely interpretive.
• Scientific substrate: minimal; relies on phenomenology.

Narrative model#

• Focuses on personal stories, meaning‑making, identity.
• Clinically useful but not scientific.
• Scientific substrate: none; interpretive.

Why these are yellow:
They mix empirical insights with non‑falsifiable constructs, making them clinically flexible but scientifically weak.

❌ RED — Non‑scientific, mythic, or historically influential but unfalsifiable approaches#

These are not scientific theories. They are interpretive systems, narrative frameworks, or historical artifacts that persist due to tradition, training, or institutional inertia.

Psychoanalysis#

• Freud, Jung, Lacan, etc.
• Unfalsifiable, interpretive, culturally shaped.
• Scientific substrate: none.

Psychodynamic theory (modern variants)#

• Updated psychoanalysis; still interpretive.
• Scientific substrate: none.

Personality typologies (non‑validated)#

• Enneagram, MBTI, etc.
• Popular but not scientific.
• Scientific substrate: none.

“Chemical imbalance” theory#

• Debunked explanatory myth.
• Scientific substrate: none.

Evolutionary psychiatry (speculative forms)#

• Some grounded hypotheses, but many claims unfalsifiable.
• Scientific substrate: weak.

Why these are red:
They lack falsifiability, rely on narrative interpretation, and do not operate on measurable substrates.

🧩 Section D Structural Snapshot#

This section exposes the core structural problem:
Psychiatry is not one theory — it is a stack of incompatible frameworks held together by institutional necessity.